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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, and 
LACEYGIRON, a minor child by and 
through her guardian, ad litem, MELANIE 
GIRON, her mother, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PANTER NOORBAKHSH, an individual, 
and ROUHIMAHOJERGHOMI, an 
individual; JAY WELCH and MARCELLA 
E. WELCH, his wife, and JOHN DOES 
1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS WELCHS" MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CTVILNO. 89-0901300DP 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
The defendants, Jay and Marcelle B. Welch, respectfully submit the following 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion for summary judgment against 
the plaintiffs. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 21,1988, the date of the accident in question, the defendant Marcelle B. 
Welch (hereinafter referred to as "Welch") was northbound in the right of two northbound lanes on 
Highland Drive in extremely heavy traffic. (See attached affidavit of Marcelle B. Welch, 
paragraphs 3 and 4; see attached deposition of Melanie Giron, page 11.) (Copies of deposition 
pages referred to herein are attached.) 
2. As Welch approached the intersection with 3300 South, traffic was backed up as far 
south as 3350 South. (See attached affidavit of Marcelle B. Welch, paragraphs 4 and 5; deposition 
of Melanie Giron, page 11.) 
3. To avoid blocking the intersection of 3350 South and Highland Drive, Welch stopped 
just south of 3350 South leaving an opening ahead of her car. (See attached affidavit of Marcelle 
B. Welch, paragraph 5; see deposition of Panter Noorbakhsh, pages 11 and 12.) 
4. The defendant Panter Noorbakhsh (hereinafter referred to as "Noorbakhsh") was 
.eastbound on 3350 South stopped at a stop sign. Noorbakhsh was attempting to pull out onto 
Highland Drive. Highland drive was the favored street with regard to right of way; 3350 South 
was the disfavored street. (See attached affidavit of Marcelle B. Welch, paragraph 6; see attached 
deposition of Panter Noorbakhsh, page 11.) 
5. For purposes of this motion for summary judgment only, it will be assumed that Welch 
did indeed signal to Noorbakhsh by a "wave" or some other signal that Noorbakhsh could pull out 
in front of Welch onto Highland Drive. (See attached affidavit of Marcelle B. Welch, paragraph 6; 
amended complaint, paragraph 4; deposition of Panter Noorbakhsh, page 12.) 
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6. Noorbakhsh then proceeded to pull out in front of the Welch vehicle which was stopped 
in the outside northbound lane of Highland Drive. Noorbakhsh then proceeded to cross the inside 
lane of Highland Drive in which the plaintiff was traveling northbound. (Affidavit of Marcelle B. 
Welch, paragraph 6; deposition of defendant Panter Noorbakhsh, pages 13 and 14; amended 
complaint, paragraph 4.) 
7. Noorbakhsh did not see the Giron vehicle and struck it broadside. (Deposition of 
Panter Noorbakhsh, page 14; amended complaint, paragraph 4.) 
8. After being struck, Giron crossed both southbound lanes of Highland Drive and struck 
a tree. (Amended complaint, paragraph 5.) 
ARGUMENT , 
I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE IN NEGLIGENCE 
CASES WHICH HAVE NO MERIT 
"Ordinarily the question of negligence and contributory negligence may not be settled on a 
motion for summary judgment. (Citations omitted.) However, when there is no showing of 
negligence on the part of a defendant, summary judgment is a proper method of eliminating cases 
which have no merit." Preston vs. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260,436 P.2d 1021,1022 -1023 (1968). 
The plaintiffs* sole allegation against Welch is that Welch contributed to the accident by 
waiving Noorbakhsh through the intersection. It is undisputed that Welch stopped short of the 
intersection. Since there were cars backed up to a point just North if the intersection of Highland 
Drive and 3350 South, Welch would have blocked the intersection if she would not have stopped 
short of it. To so block the intersection would have been in violation of Utah Code 41-6-109.10 
3 vw w 0 3 
which states '[n]o driver shall enter an intersection . . . unless there is sufficient space on the 
other side of the intersection . . . to accommodate the vehicle he is operating without obstructing 
the passage of the other vehicles . . . . " 
Accordingly, the narrow question presented to the court is that of the liability of a driver 
who "signals" another to pull out. Assuming for the sake of this motion that Welch did indeed 
"wave" Noorbakhsh out from a side street, it would be improper to find any liability on Welch for 
this act of driving courtesy. Welch had no control over Noorbakhsh. Noorbakhsh had ample 
opportunity to stop in front of the Welch vehicle and observed the traffic before proceeding into the 
left hand northbound lane. 
The facts in this case are clear, this accident was caused by the sole negligence of 
Noorbakhsh. Welch is an innocent bystander to this accident who has been drawn into a suit 
based on an act of driving courtesy. 
ARGUMENT 
II 
THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF WELCH 
IN SIGNALLING NOORBAKHSH ONTO THE HIGHWAY 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled on the question of the liability of a "signalling" driver in a 
fact situation similar to the one in the present case in Devine v. Cook. 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 
1073 (1955). Devine involved a truck driver who stopped his truck in the inner northbound lane in 
the favored four lane street at an intersection and allegedly gave a signal to cross to an eastbound 
vehicle which was attempting to pull out from a disfavored street. The car on the disfavored street 
then proceeded east across the favored street where it was struck by a vehicle in the lane next to the 
4 
signalling truck. In dismissing the cause of action against the signalling defendant, the Devine 
court concluded that the "trial court committed error in refusing to grant the motion of the 
[signaling defendant] for a directed verdict." M- at 1082. It was also noted that "[w]e do not 
believe that it is the law, that the giving of such a signal was an act of negligence on the part of the 
driver. All the signal amounted to, if given, was a manifestation on the part of [the signalling 
driver] to [the signaled driver] that as far as he was concerned [the signaled driver] could proceed." 
Id. 
Finally, the Devine court outlined exceptions to the rule they had laid down that the 
negligence of the signalling driver was not a question for the jury. These exceptions involved the 
possibility "that under certain conditions upon certain highways, such as hills or in the night time" 
the signalling driver may have culpability. I& at 1083. 
The accident at hand, of course, took place on a level highway in broad daylight. It is a 
factually stronger case than Devine since Welch's Buick Skylark would not have blocked the view 
of the signalled driver to the extent that the signalling driver's semi-truck would have blocked the 
view of the signalled driver in the Devine case. In factual settings such as those seen in Devine , as 
well as the instant case, a finding of negligence would be a distortion of a simple act of courtesy 
and extend a driver's responsibilities to an unreasonable degree. 
In short, it is well setded in this jurisdiction that a driver who, out of courtesy, gives a hand 
signal to another driver will not be held liable in a factual setting such as the Giron case. It is 
equally evident that this question is one that can be answered as a matter of law without the need to 
go to a jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
No genuine issues of material fact exist in this case. Welch obeyed Utah statute by 
stopping short of the intersection rather than blocking it. Welch's simple showing of driving 
courtesy should not have drawn her into this lawsuit. It will be in accordance with Utah Supreme 
Court precedent to decide this issue as a matter of law. No theory exists to make Welch culpable 
for the negligent acts of Noorbakhsh. The Welch defendants had nothing whatsoever to do with 
causing the Girons* injuries. Accordingly, the Welch defendants request the court to grant their 
motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this tl^day of May, 1990. 
DUNN&D 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Defendants Welch 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support 
of Welchs' Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed postage prepaid t h i s ^ W day of 
May, 1990, to the following: 
Graham Dodd, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Panter Noorbakhsh 
Rouhi Mohojerghomi 
3969 South 900 East, #21 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
V w . 07 
v.-
MARK DALTON DUNN, #4562 
DUNN & DUNN 
Attorney for defendants Welch 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIEGIRON, an individual, and AFFIDAVIT OF MARCELLA E. WELCH 
LACEYGIRON, a minor child by and 
through her guardian, ad litem, MELANIE 
GIRON, her mother, 
Plaintiffs, 
CIVIL NO. 89-0901300DP 
v. 
PANTER NOORBAKHSH, an individual, 
and ROUHIMAHOJERGHOMI, an 
individual; JAY WELCH and MARCELLA 
E. WELCH, his wife, and JOHN DOES THE HONORABLE DAVID S.YOUNG 
1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Marcelle B. Welch, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. My name is actually Marcelle B. Welch, but I am the person referred to as 
wMarcella E. Welch" in the documents of this case. I am a named defendant in the above-
entitled action. 
2. The plaintiff has alleged in her complaint that I "contributed to the accident by 
waving the defendant Panter Noorbakhsh through the intersection." 
3. On the date of the accident in question, I was northbound on Highland Drive in 
the right of two northbound lanes. 
4. Traffic had become backed up in my lane from a stop light at 3300 South to a 
point south of where I was at approximately 3350 South. 
5. To avoid blocking 3350 South (a side street going east off Highland Drive) I 
stopped just south of the side street leaving an opening ahead of me. 
6. The driver of a vehicle coming out of the side street looked at me as I waited. 
Because the side street is slightly angled to the north and the entering vehicle was also at 
that angle, there was no indication that the driver of that vehicle was intending anything 
other than simply entering my lane of traffic. I nodded my head to that driver but did not 
remove my hands from the steering wheel. The car on the side street pulled out across my 
lane. She entered the left northbound lane next to me where there was an impact with the 
plaintiffs vehicle; however, I did not actually see the impact. 
7. The northbound plaintiff vehicle then crossed the southbound lanes of Highland 
Drive and hit a tree on the west side of Highland Drive. 
8. The car pulling out of the side street was not my employee or agent and was not 
under my direction. 
DATED this JL/J^of May, 1990. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARCELLE B. WELCH 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this &t day of 77? Ci.y 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing affidavit of Marcelle B. 
Welch was mailed postage prepaid ttds^^^day of May, 1990, to the following: 
Graham Dodd, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, 
and LACEY GIRON, a minor child 
by and through her guardian, 
ad litem, Melanie Giron, 
her mother, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Panter Noorbakhsh, an 
individual, and ROUHI 
MAHOJERGHOMI, an individual; 
JAY WELCH and MARCELLA E. WELCH, 
his wife, and JOHN DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Deposition of: 
Melanie Giron 
No. 89-0901300DP 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of February, 
1990, the deposition of Melanie Giron was taken pursuant to 
notice, commencing at 9:00 a.m. of said day at 230 South 500 
East, #460, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Diana Kent, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah. 
li 
11 
. 1 
2 
3 
. 4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Do you believe that the rain affected yours, or 
any other driver's, ability to operate his or her automobile 
properly? 
A. No. 
Q. So it wasn't that heavy of rain? 
A. It was raining. The roads were wet. But it 
wasn't enough, I guess, to make you do things you probably 
wouldn't ordinarily do. 
Q. Okay. And you said that you were approaching a 
stoplight. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you planning on going straight through, at 
that stoplight, or planning to make a turn to the right or 
left? 
A. I don't recall if I was going to go straight or 
turn or not. I don't recall that. 
Q. Okay. Gould you describe for me how heavy the 
traffic was? 
* A. Extremely heavy. There was cars in front of me 
in both lanes. And the light was red. I was approaching a 
red light, slowing down for a red light. 
Q. So you were slowing down? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There's been some allegation, from some of the 
witnesses' statements, that you would have been proceeding 
v/ _ • m 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-000-
MELANIE GIRON, AN 
INDIVIDUAL, AND LACEY GIRON, 
A MINOR CHILD BY AND THROUGH 
HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
MELANIE GIRON, HER MOTHER, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
PANTEA NOORBAKHSH, AN 
INDIVIDUAL, AND ROUHI 
MAHOJERGHOMI, AN INDIVIDUAL; 
JAY WELCH AND MARCELLA E. 
WELCH, HIS WIFE, AND JOHN 
DOES 1 THROUGH 5, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CIVIL NO. 89-09013OODP 
DEPOSITION OF: 
PANTEA NOORBAKHSH 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
-000-
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 13TH DAY OF MARCH, 1990, 
THE DEPOSITION OF PANTEA NOORBAKHSH, PRODUCED AS A WITNESS 
HEREIN AT THE INSTANCE OF THE DEFENDANTS WELCH HEREIN, IN 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION NOW PENDING IN THE ABOVE-NAMED 
COURT, WAS TAKEN BEFORE TRACI L. RAMIREZ, A CERTIFIED 
SHORTHAND REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE 
OF UTAH, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 A.M. OF SAID DAY, 
AT THE OFFICE OF DUNN & DUNN, 460 MIDTOWN PLAZA, 230 SOUTH 
500 EAST, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
THAT SAID DEPOSITION WAS TAKEN PURSUANT TO NOTICE. 
-000-
TRACI L. RAMIREZ, RPR, CSR, NP 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING \J w 13 
Q BUT YOU DON'T RECALL ONE WAY OR THE OTHER? 
A I MEAN, THEY WEREN'T THERE WHEN I WAS WAITING, 
SO — 
Q THIS WAS A FREQUENT ROUTE FOR YOU TO TAKE FROM 
YOUR FRIEND'S HOME TO THE SPA; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q THAT'S A ROUTE YOU WOULD FREQUENTLY TAKE AT THIS 
PARTICULAR TIME IN THE AFTERNOON? 
A YES. 
Q PERHAPS EVERY OTHER DAY? 
A YES. 
Q NOW, WHILE YOU WERE STOPPED AT THE STOP SIGN, 
DID YOU HAVE TO WAIT ANY PARTICULAR LENGTH OF TIME FOR 
TRAFFIC TO CLEAR? 
A YES, I WAITED OVER — I DON'T KNOW — FIVE OR 
TEN MINUTES. IT WAS REALLY BACKED UP. 
Q DO YOU REALLY THINK IT WAS AS LONG AS FIVE OR 
TEN MINUTES? 
A I DON'T KNOW. IT SEEMED LIKE FOREVER. 
Q FIVE OR TEN MINUTES WOULD BE QUITE A WHILE TO 
WAIT. IT SEEMED LIKE A VERY LONG TIME; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES. 
Q THEN AT SOME POINT THERE-WAS A BREAK IN THE 
TRAFFIC? 
A NO, THIS LADY ~ THIS CAR STOPPED RIGHT HERE. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING 
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• Q YOU'RE POINTING TO THE NCV ON THIS DIAGRAM, 
WHICH IS THE VEHICLE FURTHEST TO THE SOUTH? 
A UH-HUH (AFFIRMATIVE), I GUESS. SHE MOTIONED FOR 
ME TO GO. 
Q WHAT EXACTLY DID SHE DO? 
A (WITNESS MOTIONS.) SHE MOTIONED WITH HER HAND. 
SHE MOTIONED FOR ME TO GO. SHE SMILED. 
Q SO THAT WAS THE DRIVER WHO MOTIONED YOU INTO THE 
TRAFFIC, OR WAS IT THE PASSENGER? 
A I'M NOT SURE. 
Q YOU CANNOT RECALL? 
A IT WAS A LADY. 
Q DO YOU KNOW HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE IN THAT 
VEHICLE? 
A TWO. 
Q THEY WERE BOTH WOMEN, WERE THEY NOT? 
A I THINK ONE WAS THE OTHER ONE'S MOTHER OR 
SOMETHING. 
Q I THINK THAT'S RIGHT. YOU DO NOT KNOW WHICH OF 
THE TWO ACTUALLY MOTIONED FOR YOU TO COME INTO THE 
TRAFFIC? 
A I BELIEVE IT WAS THE DRIVER. 
Q YOU SAID SHE MOTIONED WITH .HER HAND; IS THAT 
RIGHT? 
A UH-HUH (AFFIRMATIVE). 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING __^__ 
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1 Q IS THAT A YES? 
2 A YES. SORRY. 
3 Q THAT'S FINE. WAS IT A VERY DEFINITE MOTION? 
4 A YES, IT WAS LIKE ~ 
5 Q MOVING HER FINGERS? 
6 A SHE MOTIONED FOR ME TO COME, AND SHE SMILED, AND 
7 I SAID THANKS. 
8 Q DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU WERE REQUIRED TO MOVE OUT 
9 INTO TRAFFIC WHEN SHE MOTIONED TO YOU? 
10 A YES, I GUESS. I THOUGHT — 
11 Q THAT YOU HAD NO CHOICE? 
12 A I GUESS I HAD A CHOICE, BUT I FELT LIKE SHE 
13 OFFERED ME — I MEAN, SHE SAID GO, SO I'M NOT GOING TO SAY 
14 NO, NO, NO, YOU GO. I MEAN, I DON'T KNOW. 
15 Q WHILE YOU WERE STOPPED AT THAT STOP SIGN, DID 
16 YOU HAVE A BLINKER ON? 
17 A YES, I DID. 
18 Q WHICH WAY WAS THAT BLINKER HEADED? 
19 A LEFT. 
20 Q ARE YOU CERTAIN THAT YOU HAD YOUR BLINKER ON? 
21 A YES, I'M SURE. 
22 Q DO YOU RECALL IF YOUR VEHICLE WAS ANGLED ANY 
23 DIRECTION? 
24 A NO, I DON'T. 
25 Q YOU DON'T RECALL ONE WAY OR THE OTHER? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING .
 n 
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1 A WHAT DO YOU MEAN? 
2 Q WELL, WAS IT ANGLED JUST STRAIGHT OUT INTO THE 
3 ROADWAY? WAS IT ANGLED TO THE LEFT WHILE YOU WERE 
4 STOPPED, ANGLED TO THE RIGHT? 
5 A WHILE I WAS STOPPED IN FRONT OF THIS CAR? 
6 Q WHILE YOU WERE STOPPED AT THE STOP SIGN. 
7 A OH, JUST STRAIGHT. 
8 Q NOW, WHEN YOU STARTED TO PULL OUT, DID YOU LOOK 
9 FOR OTHER TRAFFIC? 
10 A YES, I DID. I STOPPED IN FRONT OF THIS CAR, THE 
11 LADY WHO GAVE ME THE RIGHT-OF-WAY. I LOOKED, AND I 
12 COULDN'T SEE ANY CARS COMING, AND THEN I CAME OUT A LITTLE 
13 BIT MORE, AND I GUESS THAT'S WHEN THIS PERSON WAS GOING 
14 REALLY FAST OR SOMETHING, BECAUSE I DIDN'T SEE HIM. 
15 NEITHER ONE OF US SAW HIM — OR HER. 
16 Q LET ME SEE IF I HAVE THIS STRAIGHT. YOU WERE 
17 STOPPED AT THE STOP SIGN, THE WOMAN IN THE NCV VEHICLE 
18 MOST FURTHEST SOUTH MOTIONED FOR YOU TO MOVE INTO TRAFFIC, 
19 AND YOU STARTED TO EASE YOUR WAY OUT INTO THE TRAFFIC. IS 
20 THAT ACCURATE? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q YOU ACTUALLY CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP IN THE LANE 
23 THAT SHOWS THE FOUR NCV VEHICLES? 
24 I A AS I RECALL. 
25 Q SO YOU PULLED OUT AND CAME TO ANOTHER COMPLETE 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING 
— 17 
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Graham Dodd, Esq, - USB. No, A0896 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, 
and LACEY GIRON, a minor child 
by and through her guardian, ad 
litem, MELANIE GIRON, her 
mother, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PANTER NOORBAKHSH, an 
i n d i v i d u a l , a n d ROUHI 
MAHOJERGHOMI, an i n d i v i d u a l ; 
JAY WELCH and MARCELLA E. 
WELCH, h i s w i f e , and JOHN DOES 
1 through 5 , 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS f MEMORANDUM 
OPPOSING DEFENDANTS WELCHS» 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0901300DP 
Judge David S. Young 
The plaintiffs respectfully submit the following 
Memoranda of Points and Authorities opposing the defendants Welchs1 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Disputed Facts: 
A) Marcella Welch claims that she stopped to avoid 
blocking the intersection of 3350 South and Highland Drive. 
(Affidavit of Marcella Welch, pg. 5). However, her own daughter's 
testimony (see copy of Deposition of Maile Verbica, attached, at 
page 8, line 11) indicates that she was stopped south of 3350 South 
because there were cars ahead of her. This is substantiated by the 
deposition of defendant Pantea Noorbakhsh attached (at page 11, 
line 23). When asked if there was a break in the traffic, she 
responded no, but that Marcella Welch stopped south of 3350 South 
to let her through. (See copy of police report which was Exhibit #1 
to the deposition and is attached.) 
B) That the defendant Pantea Noorbakhsh, as she waited 
to enter Highland Drive at the stop sign, was signalling to turn 
left, and her automobile was pointing directly west and not angled. 
(See her deposition, pg. 13, line 17; line 7, pg 14.) Marcella 
Welch claims that she thought the car was going to turn right. (See 
her Affidavit, Paragraph 6.) 
C) That Marcella Welch stopped her automobile to provide 
space and motioned for the defendant Pantea Noorbakhsh to proceed 
across Highland Drive. (See deposition of Pantea Noorbakhsh, pg. 
12, line 6 and line 22; line 6 pg. 13; line 25, pg. 11) and 
(Deposition of daughter Maile Verbica at pg. 8, lines 11 through 
18.) Mrs. Welch indicates that she simply nodded her head. 
D) That defendant Pantea Noorbakhsh stopped in front of 
defendant Marcella Welch to see if cars were coming on the inside 
lane on Highland Drive before proceeding. (See Pantea Noorbakhsh 
Deposition, pg. 14, line 10.) But Marcella Welch claims that there 
was no stopping. (See Marcella Welch, Affidavit, paragraph 6.) 
* -^  -G'.>i'9i 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated in numerous cases that 
because the granting of the Welch's motion in this case would deny 
the plaintiffs the benefit of a trial on the merits, the facts must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs herein. 
Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co.. 90 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23 (1988) . In addition, the said court has cautioned 
that "Ordinarily the question of negligence and contributory 
negligence may not be settled on a motion for summary judgment." 
Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968) Therefore, 
the issue of this motion is whether or not based upon the facts as 
contained in the depositions of the parties, together with the 
Affidavit of Marcella Welch taken in their most favorable light to 
the plaintiffs, create a cause of action which would allow the 
plaintiffs to go to the jury. 
II. ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE 
The essential elements of a negligence claim are duty, 
breach of that duty, and damage or injury as a proximate result of 
the breach. In Wheeler v. Jones, 431 P.2d 985, 19 Utah 2d 392 
(1967) the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Negligence is the breach 
of a duty to use due care under the circumstances of the 
situation." And that "the degree of care increases in proportion 
to the hazards to be anticipated." Erickson v. Bennion, 503 P.2d 
139, 28 Utah 2d 371 (1972). Again in discussing the degree of care 
the said Court has held that the "amount of care to avoid 
1 
negligence varies with the risk of harm which is known,or under the 
circumstances ought to be known to exist." Briaham v. Moon Lake 
Electric Asn. . 470 P.2d 3983, 24 Utah 2d 292 (1970). The facts 
indicate that on a very busy highway, on a rainy day, the defendant 
Marcella Welch stopped her vehicle, made room and motioned the 
defendant Noorbakhsh onto Highland Drive where Noorbakhsh collided 
with the plaintiff's vehicle causing property damage and personal 
bodily injury. However, Welch argues that it was simply an act of 
courtesy. While it is unfortunate that there appear to be no Utah 
cases directly on point, the Utah Supreme Court has said that, "If 
negligent acts of two or more persons concur in injuring another, 
either or both may be held responsible." (emphasis added) Mast 
vs. Irvine. 449 P.2d 996, 22 Utah 2d 154 (1969). Defendant 
Noorbakhsh states in her deposition that she had been waiting a 
long time at the stop sign and when defendant Welch stopped and 
motion for her to enter Highland Drive, she felt required to move 
out into the traffic. (See her deposition, pg 13, line 9). Under 
the conditions existing at the time, Welch had a duty of care to 
other drivers on the road not to do anything which would cause an 
accident or lead to an accident. But between her actions and those 
of the defendant Noorbakhsh, combined, they caused the accident. 
It is fundamentally clear that if defendant Marcella Welch had not 
stopped, made room, and motioned defendant Noorbakhsh to enter 
Highland Drive, that Noorbakhsh would not have collided with the 
plaintiffs. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has so found in Ripka 
2 
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v, Mehus. 390 N.W.2d 878. In that case a road workman waived a 
motorist into an intersection who then collided with the plaintiff. 
Unfortunately, the motorist was unable to find the workman who had 
waved her through and at the trial was found by a jury to be 85% 
liable for the accident. The motorist appealed claiming error 
because trial court had not submitted his claim of joint 
tortfeasor, i.e. workman and motorist to the jury. The Appellate 
Court upheld trial court because of lack of evidence about the 
workman, but stated as a matter of law in its opinion 
Alleged negligence of 'phantom tortfeasor' for 
waving woman into intersection through stop 
sign was not irrelevant to suit by motorist who 
was struck, as one who waives one automobile 
into path of another breaches duty of care to 
any person injured in resulting accident, 
(emphasis added) ^ 
A similar accident to the one before this Court took 
place in 1984 in Louisiana. But in that case the plaintiff failed 
to join the person who had waived the car into the intersection
 i 
which then caused the accident, as a party defendant. The 
Louisiana Court held that since the person who waived the 
tortfeasor into the highway, "...are not made defendants by < 
plaintiff... it is not necessary that we discuss their negligence." 
Hardee v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 445 So.2d 771, clearly 
indicating that had they been joined they would have been < 
negligent, or that their negligence would have been considered by 
the Court. 
i 
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III. PREMATURE MOTION 
Plaintiffs submit that to grant the Welch motion would 
deny the trier of fact the opportunity to determine if Mrs. Welch 
breached her duty of care. Construing the evidence most favorably 
to plaintiffs, reasonable minds could differ as to whether 
defendant Welch should have been aware of the hazard posed in 
crossing Highland Drive under the circumstances, given the weather 
conditions, the congested traffic and the fact that Welch's car was 
blocking the view of Pantea Noorbakhsh. Defendant Welch argues 
that no matter what Welch did to waive Noorbakhsh through the 
intersection, nor what the conditions were, the law of the land is 
that Welch has no liability or duty of care to the plaintiffs. For 
this Welch relies upon the 1955 case of Devine v. Cook. 3 Utah 2d 
134, 279, P.2d 1073. However, it should be noted that in Devine 
(supra) the Supreme Court did in fact grant a new trial to 
plaintiffs based upon errors of the trial court. In addition, the 
question of the liability of the truck driver who had waived the 
tortfeasor through the intersection was only put to the jury after 
all the evidence was in. In short, a full trial on the merits had 
been held before the question of the additional tortfeasor's 
comparative negligence was submitted to the jury. Welch with her 
current motion, is attempting to deny a full trial upon the merits. 
Plaintiffs submit that Devine (supra) does not stand for the 
proposition that, as a matter of law, that the alleged negligence 
of a "co-tortfeasor" could never be submitted to a jury for 
4 
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comparative negligence" apportionment. In Devine (supra), there 
was some question as to whether or not the alleged "co-tortfeasor" 
had waived the tortfeasor through the intersection. In the instant 
case, all of those parties whose depositions are submitted, agree 
that Welch stopped, made room for Noorbakhsh to proceed and 
motioned for her to proceed. (See copies of depositions attached.) 
The testimony submitted is also conclusive, that there was heavy 
traffic and that it was raining. None of the above conditions 
existed in Devine (supra), and plaintiffs submit that they have 
the right to submit their case to the jury, or at least have the 
trial judge decide after all the facts are in whether it should go 
to the jury. The Supreme Court made it clear that it did not 
intend its ruling on the "co-tortfeasor" to be binding when it said 
in Devine (infra) at page 1083: 
...we do not mean to say, nor to be understood 
as saying, that the decision reached in the 
case would be or should be applied to all cases 
involving signals or motions given by drivers 
of vehicles to others. 
In addition, the case of Frey v. Woodard, 748 F.2d 173 
(1984) the U.S. Court of Appeals found that a Summary Judgment was 
not proper in a case where some pedestrians were injured, after a 
marine truck driver had waived a civilian vehicle through an 
intersection and said vehicle subsequently injured them. The court 
found at page 176, 
Where, as here, reasonable minds might differ 
as to the inference which might be drawn even 
5 
from the undisputed facts, a summary judgment 
is improper, (emphasis added) 
In addition, plaintiffs have not found any case where 
Divine (supra) has been followed with respect to its holding on the 
alleged "co-tortfeasor." Finally, Welch agrees that she obeyed a 
certain Utah statute Section 41-6-109.10. Plaintiffs submit that 
the statute does not apply in the instant case, since defendant 
Noorbakhsh had a stop sign barring her entrance to Highland Drive 
which she could not violate without being able to proceed safely, 
unless someone assisted her in the decision as to whether it was 
safe or not. Again plaintiffs submit that this is a proper 
question to be submitted to the jury after all the evidence is in. 
Besides the Utah Supreme Court made it clear in Wardell v. Jerman. 
423 P.2d 485, 18 Utah 2d 359 (1962) that people could not hide 
behind statutes when it said: 
Neither compliance with statute or ordinance 
nor with requirements of due care in some 
particulars confers any immunity upon party 
duty of exercising due care in other respects. 
In reversing a trial court which had granted a Summary 
Judgment in an negligence case involving an automobile collision 
the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Issues of negligence ordinarily present 
questions of fact to be resolved by fact 
finder; it is only when facts are undisputed 
and but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn 
therefrom, that such issues become questions 
of law. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney. 
706 P.2d 614 (1985) at page 615. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs submit that there are sufficient ambiguities 
in the facts that the triers thereof could find a breach of the 
duty of care on the part of defendant Welch. Also that the law is 
not clear in Utah on this subject and therefore cannot be 
controlling in the instant case. That reasonable people could 
reach different conclusions, both as to the law and the facts to be 
applied in the case and that this decision should only be made 
after all the facts have been deduced. Therefore, plaintiffs 
submit that Welchs1 motion is premature and should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of June, 1990. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
-^Graham Dodd, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 4th day of June, 1990, I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs1 Memorandum Opposing 
Defendant Welchs1 Motion for Summary Judgment to the following: 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Defendants Welch 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Paul S. Felt, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GIRON, MELANIE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
NOORBAKHSH, PANTER 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890901300 PD 
DATE 10/24/90 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. DODD, GRAHAM 
D. ATTY. FELT, PAUL S. 
AT ORAL ARGUMENT ON 9-10-90 THE COURT GRANTED THE WELCH'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ASKED MR. DUNN TO PREPARE AN 
ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE RULING. ON 10-03-90 PLAINTIFF FILED 
IT'S "OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND MOTION TO AMEND AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR A TRIAL." THE DEFENDANT'S WELCH FILED THEIR "REPLY" ON 
10-11-90 WITH THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT. THE COURT 
SIGNED THE ORDER GRANTING THE WELCH'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10-11-
90. 
IN ORDER THE THE RECORD IS CLEAR, THE COURT STATES AS 
FOLLOWS: (1) THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO MR. AND 
MRS. WELCH SHALL REMAIN AS SIGNED ON OCTOBER 11, 1990. (2) THE 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS THERETO ARE DENIED. (3) FOR PURPOSES OF 
APPEAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SAME SHALL BE DEEMED TO 
BEGIN THIS DATE 10-24-90. 
C.C. TO COUNSEL 
MARK DALTON DUNN, #4562 
DUNN & DUNN 
Attorney for defendants Welch 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, and 
LACEY GIRON, a minor child by and 
through her guardian, ad litem, MELANIE 
GIRON, her mother, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PANTER NOORBAKHSH, an individual, 
and ROUHIMAHOJERGHOMI, an 
individual; JAY WELCH and MARCELLA 
E. WELCH, his wife, and JOHN DOES 
1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CIVIL NO. 89-0901300DP 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
The Welch defendants' motion for summary judgment was briefed and came for hearing on 
September 10, 1990, with Graham Dodd appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, Paul S. Felt 
appearing on behalf of the defendants Noorbakhsh and Mahojerghomi, and Mark Dalton Dunn 
appearing on behalf of the Welch defendants. The court, having reviewed the pleadings and heard 
oral argument, enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and orders a dismissal 
of the plaintiffs cause of action against the Welch defendants. 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Ciarfc 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 21,1988, the date of the accident in question, the defendant Marcelle B. 
Welch (hereinafter referred to as "Welch") was northbound in the right lane of two northbound 
lanes on Highland Drive in heavy traffic. 
2. As Welch approached the intersection of Highland Drive and 3300 South, traffic was 
backed up as far south as the intersection of 3350 South and Highland Drive. 
3. In order to avoid blocking the intersection of 3350 South and Highland Drive, Welch 
stopped south of 3350 South leaving an opening ahead of her car. 
4. The defendant Panter Noorbakhsh (hereinafter referred to as "Noorbakhsh") was 
westbound on 3350 South stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of 3350 South and Highland 
Drive. 
5. Noorbakhsh was attempting to pull out onto Highland Drive. 
6. Highland Drive was the favored street with regard to right of way and 3350 South was 
the disfavored street. 
7. Welch made some sort of signal to Noorbakhsh that Noorbakhsh could pull out in front 
of Welch onto Highland Drive. 
8. After Noorbakhsh proceeded to pull out in front of the Welch vehicle, which was 
stopped in the right hand northbound lane of Highland Drive, Noorbakhsh proceeded to cross the 
left hand northbound lane of Highland Drive in which the plaintiffs were travelling northbound. 
9. Noorbakhsh did not see the plaintiffs1 vehicle and stuck it broadside. 
10. As a result of the aforementioned accident, the plaintiffs claim to have suffered 
personal injury and brought this lawsuit to recover damages therefor. 
2 ^ w 
Il I t )it Da vmlxT IS, 1989, the Welch defendants filed an offer of judgment in the amount 
of $100.00 pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was not accepted 
by the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i. Utah Supreme Court case of Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 
(1955) is the controlling case in this jurisdiction over this matter. 
2 Die Devine court held that there was no duty on the part of a signalling driver, such as 
Wekf i . J- i"h as Nix>rhaUish. oi flic plaintiff in a fact situation very similar 
to the one at hand. 
3. The Devine court set forth exceptions to when a duty may be created, however, those 
exceptions are not applicable in the case at hand. 
4 No genuine issue of material fact exists. 
5 Die • "W1 elch defendants' motion foi summary judgment is granted and the plaintiffs' 
cause of action against the Welch defendants is dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
6 The plaintiffs are ordered to pay costs in the amount of $ to the Welch 
defendants pursuant m Kule^  Vldii ,m<l f»Kib| ol itn1 lli.ih Riilc oi Civil Procedure -mil as 
supported by a memorandum of costs submitted by counsel for the Welch defendants. 
DATED this / ^%jTof rbjftfc*^- . 1990. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
Ljb^2 
DAVIDS 
District Co 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal was mailed postage prepaid this^L^liay of 
September, 1990, to the following: 
Graham Dodd, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
0; 1 A t f ^ 
Graham Dodd, Esq. - USB No. A0896 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, and 
LACEY GIRON, a minor child by and 
through er guardian, ad litem, MELANIE 
GIRON, her mother, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PANTER NOORBAKHSH, an individual, 
and ROUHI MAHOJERGHOMI, an 
individual; JAY WELCH and 
MARCELLA E. WELCH, his wife, and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND 
MOTION TO AMEND AND IN THE 
ALTERNAIWE FOR A TRIAL 
Civil No. 89-0901300DP 
Judge David S. Young 
COME NOW the plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Graham Dodd, 
and object to the Findings ol Fad Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal as 
heretofore submitted by the defendants Welch in the above entitled matter. The plaintiffs' 
3.3 
objection is based on Rules 52(b); 59 and 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
is hereinafter enumerated in detail as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. At the hearing in this matter, based on the notes taken by the plaintiffs' 
attorney, the only ruling made by the Court was that based upon the evidence submitted 
to the Court as contained in the file, that the Court found that the defendants Welch had 
merely been courteous in stopping to allow the defendant Panter Noorbakhsh through the 
intersection, and that there was no liability attached to the act and the defendants Welch 
did not assume any of the said defendant Panter Noorbakhsh's negligence. 
2. In granting the defendants Welchs' motion for summary judgment, the 
Court made no findings with respect to any other matter and specifically not with respect 
to any costs as the said defendants Welch now claim. 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS 
1. The Court made its above ruling based upon Welch's motion for summary 
judgment. Therefore, The facts in the case must be viewed, and therefore stated in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs herein. Copper State Leasing vs. Blacker Appliance 
and Furniture Company. 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988). (emphasis added) 
2. Findings of Fact No. 1 fails to state that the time was approximately 4:00 
p.m. and that the weather conditions ^ vere rain) and overca st (See Deposition of Melanie 
Giron.) 
3. Findings of Fact No. 3. The deposition of the defendant Welch's own 
daughter Maile V erbica indicated that the defendant Marcella E Welch was stopped south 
of 3350 South and Highland Drive because there were cars ahead of her not because she 
wanted to avoid blocking the intersection. This is substantiated by the deposition of the 
defendant Punter NoorhakJish. 
4. Findings of Fact No. 4 should indicate that not only was the defendant 
Panter Noorbakhsh westbound on 3350 South and stopped at the stop sign at the 
intersection i Highland Drive, but also that she was in the center of 3350 
South and was signalling to go left. (See Deposition of Panter Noorbakhsh.) 
5. Findings of Fact No. 5 should indicate Panter Noorbakhsh was attempting 
tu pull tait uiilu Highland Drive iiml that she was attempting to turn left on Highland 
Drive. 
6. Findings of Fact No. 7 should indicate not that Defendant 1\ lai cella Welch 
made some sort of signal, but that she motioned for the defendant Panter Noorbakhsh to 
proceed across Highland Drive. (See Deposition of Panter Noorbakhsh and also the 
Deposition of Maile Verbica.) Mrs. Welch herself indicates that she nodded her head. 
-3-
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7. Findings of Fact No. 8 should reflect that the defendant Noorbakhsh 
stopped in front of the defendant Welch's car in the process of crossing Highland Drive, 
to see if cars were coming on the inside lane on Highland Drive before proceeding. (See 
Deposition of Panter Noorbakhsh.) 
8. Findings of Fact No. 9 spelling error should read Noorbakhsh did not see 
the plaintiffs vehicle and struck it broadside. 
9. Findings of Fact No. 10 should read, "As a result of the aforementioned 
accident, the plaintiffs claim to have suffered personal injury and property damage, and 
have brought this lawsuit to recover damages therefor." 
10. Findings of Fact No. 11 should be eliminated since Rule 68(b) only { 
allows that evidence thereof is admissible in a proceeding to determine costs. At the time 
of the hearing herein, this Court made no determination and award of costs to the 
defendants Welch, according to the notes taken by the plaintiffs' attorney at the said 
hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ( 
1. The plaintiffs' attorney remembers no conclusion made by the Court as 
suggested in Conclusions of Law No. 1 at the time of the hearing. 
2. The plaintiffs object to Conclusions of Law No. 2 since the defendants 
Welch have tried to read into the Divine decision facts identical to the case at bar which 
4-
do not exist. The Divine Court merely stated that upon the facts before it, there could 
be no liability. In addition, the Supreme Court in the Divine decision, page 1083 stated, 
"We do not mean to say, nor to be understood as saying, that the decision reached in the 
case would be or should be applied to all cases involving signals or motions given by 
drivers of vehicles to others." Plaintiffs submit that this i s in direct opposition to the 
proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2. 
3 The plaintiffs object to Conclusion of Law No. 3 since the Divine Court 
did not intend that their decision he expansive and cover all conditions, TV Court merely 
cited two conditions under which a signaller may be liable; to-wit, at nighttime or the crest 
of a hill. While the plaintiffs admit that the accident at bar did not occur at night on the 
brow of a hill, the plaintiffs also submit that it was not Ihe intent of the Divine Court to 
limit future cases with the two exceptions that they cited. 
4. The plaintiffs object to Conclusions of Law No. 4 and submit that there 
are genuine issues of material fact as contained in ihe plaintiffs' Memorandum Opposing 
Defendants Welchs' Motion for Summary Judgment and listed on pages 1 and 2 thereof. 
5. The plaintiffs object to Conclusions of Law N o, 5 based on the differing 
facts between Divine and the case at bar, and upon the law of negligence as outlined in 
the plaintiffs' Memorandum Opposing Defendants Welchs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and as submitted to the Court in the cases proffered at the time of the oral argument held 
herein, 
6. The plaintiffs object to the Conclusions of Law No. 6 since the Court 
never ordered any payment of costs and in addition the costs as outlined in the 
Memorandum of Costs submitted by Welchs' attorney, are not supported by cancelled 
checks or paid invoices, and list items not normally and regularly included in costs as 
defined by the Rules of Civil Procedure. This objection is based upon Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 54(d). In addition, the plaintiff herem is engaged 
in a state rehabilitation program, and is supported by the State of Utah and is in no 
position to pay the costs demanded. 
GENERAL ARGUMENT 
1. Rule 59(a) provides that a new hearing may be granted or that a previous 
judgment may be amended when there is an insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict. 
Plaintiffs submit that Divine is not controlling in the case at bar because of the following 
differing facts many of which are disputed in the depositions before the Court. 
(a) Divine was a left turn from a main highway to a side street, with the signaller 
being the turning vehicle. The case at bar is a left turn on to a main highway with the 
signaller going straight. 
(b) Road and weather conditions in Divine were clear and dry with no much traffic. 
In the case at bar the weather was J CW 
(c) The two examples in Divine where liability might be found according to the Court 
were "nighttime" and "hill" conditions. Both of these have a factor which is common to 
. . case al har, >,e did flic signaJee believe th r Th ignaller was in a better position to 
examine the dangers, and therefore that the signaller had examined the dangers and 
signalled an all clear. 
(d) Courts and commenta tors which have considered this question all agree that if the 
signaller is in a better position, the question is for the jury. See Massingale v. Sibley. 449 
So.2d 98 (Pa. 1984); Cunningham v. Nat. Service Industries. Inc.. 331 S E 2d 899 (Cra. 
App. ' 1985); Wulf v. Rebbun. 131 N.W. 2d 303, (Wise. 1964); Askew v. Zeller. 521 A.2d 
459 (Pa. Super. 1987). 
(e) Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) states: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously oi for consideration, to 
render services to another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is 
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect 
his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk 
of such harm, or 
-7-
(b) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other 
or third person upon the undertaking. 
(f) Plaintiffs submit that the Court should determine if the signaller's action was 
something other than a "mere courtesy". The Court must examine the weather and road 
conditions, the positions of the respective vehicles, the time of day, the reasonable 
interpretation the other driver could give to the signaller's motion, whether the signaller 
was negligent and the legal cause of the accident or a contributing factor thereto or 
whether a jury could reasonably so find. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs submit that the facts taken in the best light for the plaintiffs 
demonstrate material disputes as to what occurred and should go to the jury. Divine is 
not controlling and was not intended to be. Therefore, the Court decision should be 
amended and the case at bar should go to trial. 
DATED this J%J(day of October, 1990. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
- ^ pgrtEam Dodd f 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 3^4 day of October, 1990,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions Law and Order of Dismissal and 
Motion to Amend and in the Alternative for a 1'ruil postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Paul S. Felt, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
d:\sdodd\giron.obj 
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Graham Dodd, Esq. - USB No. A0896 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, 
and LACEY GIRON, a minor child 
by and through her guardian, ad 
litem, MELANIE GIRON, her 
mother, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
JAY WELCH and MARCELLA E. 
WELCH, his wife, and JOHN DOES 
1 through 5, 
Defendants/Respondents -
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No- 89-0901300DP 
Judge David S. Young 
Notice is "hereby given that plaintiffs/appellants, above 
named, hereby appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from that certain 
Order of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Court dated October 11, 1990, granting Summary 
Judgment to the defendants Welch and the Minute Entry dated October 
24, 1990, denying Plaintiffsf objections to the Summary Judgment 
entered in this action. 
This appeal is taken from the entire Order and Minute Entry. 
DATED this $Ll *~ day of November, 1990. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
>GrSham Dodd 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 32 8-3 600 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the p£/' day of November, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, 
first class postage prepaid to the following: 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
d:\sdodd\giron.app 
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Graham Dodd, Esq, - USB No. A0896 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, 
and LACEY GIRON, a minor child 
by and through her guardian, ad 
litem, MELANIE GIRON, her 
mother, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
JAY WELCH and MARCELLA E. 
WELCH, his wife, and JOHN DOES 
1 through 5, 
Defendants/Respondents 
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24, 1990, denying Plaintiffs1 objections to the Summary Judgment 
entered in this action. 
This appeal is taken from the entire Order and Minute Entry. 
DATED this $2 day of November, 1990. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
^^haiii Dodd 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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I hereby certify that on the $g-day of November, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, 
first class postage prepaid to the following: 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Third Judicial District 
Graham Dodd, Esq. - USB No. A0896 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, an individual, 
and LACEY GIRON, a minor child 
by and through her guardian, ad 
litem, MELANIE GIRON, her 
mother, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PANTER NOORBAKHSH, a n 
i n d i v i d u a l , a n d ROUHI 
MAHOJERGHOMI, an i n d i v i d u a l ; 
JAY WELCH and MARCELLA E. 
WELCH, h i s w i f e , and JOHN DOES 
1 t h r o u g h 5 , 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 89-0901300DP 
Judge David S. Young 
Upon the Stipulation and Motion of the parties, and it 
appearing to the Court that the above-entitled action has been 
fully compromised and settled, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that PANTER 
NOORBAKHSH, an individual, and ROUHI MAHOJERGHOMI, an individual, 
be dismissed from the above-entitled action. Said dismissal is 
with prejudice' and upon the merits, each party to bear; its own 
costs. 
DATED AND SIGNED t h i s b day of w^9\rf]oiJ{ . / 1990. 
BYxTEffiS COURT: 
DAVID S. YOUN 
D i s t r i c t Judg 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
S^# 
Paul S. Felt 
Attorney for Defendants 
Panter Noorbakhsh and 
Rouhi Mahojerghomi 
d:\sneslen\giron.ord 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANIE GIRON, AN INDIVIDUAL, ) 
AND LACEY GIRON, A MINOR CHILD 
BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN, AD ) 
LITEM, MELANIE GIRON, HER 
MOTHER, ) 
PLAINTIFFS/APPEALLANTS,) CIVIL NO. C-89-0901300 
-VS- ) DEFENDANT'S WELCHS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
PANTER NOORBAKHSH, AN INDIVIDUAL, ) JUDGMENT 
AND ROUHI MAHOJERGHOMI, AN 
INDIVIDUAL; JAY WELCH AND ) 
MARCELLA E. WELCH, HIS WIFE, 
AND JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5, ) 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS.) 
BE IT REMEMERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 10TH DAY 
OF SEPTEMBER, 1990, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:07 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN 
THE COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD 
BY THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
49 
1 A P P E A R A N C E S 
2 I FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: GRAHAM DODD 
KIRTON, MC CONKIE & POELMAN 
*. . 1800 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
4 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1004 
5 | FOR DEFENDANTS WELCH: MARK D. DUNN 
DUNN & DUNN 
6
 | 460 MIDTOWN PLAZA 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST 
7
 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
* I ALSO PRESENT: PAUL S. FELT 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
*|'. ' " 79 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 45385 
tO | SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-038^ 
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14 £AGE 
'5 MR. DODD'S ARGUMENT 3 
1 6
 MR. DUNN'S ARGUMENT 13 
1 7
 | JUDGE'S RULING 15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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£ R _ 0 £ E _ E _ D J _ N G S _ 
JUDGE YOUNG: GOOD MORNING. THE RECORD MAY 
SHOW THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER 
OF MELANIE GIRON VERSUS PANTER NOORBAKHSH. 
MR. DUNN: I'D LIKE TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH 
\ POLICE REPORT. THAT MAY BE HELPFUL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, ACTUALLY, MR. DUNN, I'VE 
READ ALL YOUR PLEADINGS AND I THINK THE PLACE TO START 
WOULD FRANKLY BE WITH MR. DODD. 
MR. DODD, I HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME SEEING WHY--
AND I'LL JUST INDICATE INITIALLY--I HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME 
SEEING WHY, LET'S SEE, THE PARENTS, THE WELCHES, SHOULD 
BE RESPONSIBLE FOR WAVING SOMEBODY THROUGH THE INTERSECTION 
AND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LIABILITY OR THE ACCIDENT THAT 
OCCURS BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO LOOK BEYOND THAT. SO WHY 
DON'T YOU GO AHEAD AND GIVE ME YOUR ARGUMENT AS TO WHY 
YOU THINK THEY SHOULD REMAIN IN THE LAWSUIT. 
MR. DODD: YOUR HONOR, THE DEFENDANT WELCH RELIES 
ON THE DEVINE CASE THEY'VE CITED IN THEIR BRIEF. AND WE 
WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE DEVINE CASE IS NOT CONTROLLING IN 
THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE OF FACTS. ALSO 
BECAUSE THE DEVINE DECISION WAS ONLY MADE AFTER ALL THE 
EVIDENCE WAS IN. THIS MOTION HERE IS FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHICH SEEKS TO DENY THE PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO GO TO THE 
JURY AND PRESENT ALL THE FACTS. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
NOW, IN MY BRIEF AT PAGE 5 I QUOTED LANGUAGE 
FROM THE DEVINE CASE WHERE THAT COURT SAID, ". . . WE 
DO NOT MEAN TO SAY, NOR TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS SAYING, THAT 
THE DECISION REACHED IN THE CASE WOULD BE OR SHOULD BE 
APPLIED TO ALL CASES INVOLVING SIGNALS OR MOTIONS GIVEN 
BY DRIVERS OF VEHICLES TO OTHERS." 
WE WOULD SUBMIT, YOUR HONOR, THAT THE FACTS 
IN THE CASE AT BAR ARE DIFFERENT THAN THE FACTS AS APPEARED 
IN THE DEVINE CASE. FIRST OF ALL, THE SIGNALOR IN THE 
10 | DEVINE CASE WAS MAKING A LEFT TURN. THE SIGNALEE WAS SEEKING1 
H I TO CROSS AN INTERSECTION WHERE FOUR ROADS MET 
12 I IN THE DEVINE CASE THE SIGNALEE HAD CLEAR VISION 
13 OF WHAT WAS COMING UP THE ROAD. IN THE CASE AT BAR WE 
1 4
 DO NOT HAVE A FOUR INTERSECTION, FOUR ROAD INTERSECTION, 
1 5
 I WE HAVE A THREE ROAD INTERSECTION. AND THE WELCH'S CAR 
WAS STOPPED RIGHT IN FRONT--NOT IN FRONT, BUT BLOCKING 16 
*
7
. THE VIEW OF THE SIGNALEE. THE SIGNALOR WAS IN THE BETTER 
18 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
POSITION TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS COMING UP BEHIND, 
*
9
 JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOU'RE ASKING ME TO SAY THAT 
THE WELCHES SHOULD BE RETAINED IN THIS LAWSUIT BECAUSE— 
AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THEY WERE NORTHBOUND ON HIGHLAND DRIVE. 
IT SEEMS TO ME THERE IS A TYPO IN YOUR MEMORANDUM, MR. 
2 3
 DUNN. WASN'T MR. NOORBAKHSH WESTBOUND NOT EASTBOUND? 
MR. DUNN: THAT IS CORRECT. I APOLOGIZE, YOUR 
HONOR. 
•52. 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: SO MR. NOORBAKHSH IS WESTBOUND 
2 COMING OUT OF 3350 SOUTH AND HE COLLIDES WITH THE CAR IN 
3 THE NORTHBOUND LANE HEADED NORTH BUT IN THE INSIDE LANE. 
4 MR. DODD: THAT IS CORRECT. THAT IS THE WELCHES. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: THE WELCHES SIMPLY GAVE HIM ACCESS 
6 TO THEIR LANE AND NOTHING MORE. WHY WOULDN'T HE BE RESPON-
7
 SIBLE FOR LOOKING TO HIS LEFT WHEN HE CAME THROUGH THERE 
8 TO SEE THAT THE NEXT LANE WAS CLEAR? ALL THEY YIELDED 
9 IS WHAT THEY HAD. 
10 MR. DODD: THE DEPOSITION OF NOORBAKHSH DID 
11 SAY THAT SHE DID LOOK, THAT SHE DID NOT SEE MY CLIENT COMING 
12 UP THE INSIDE LANE. SHE ALSO SAID THAT SHE'D WAITED FIVE 
13 TO TEN MINUTES AT THAT INTERSECTION TRYING TO GET ON TO 
14 HIGHLAND DRIVE. WHEN WELCHES STOPPED AND WAVED HER THROUGH 
15 THE INFERENCE CAN BE DRAWN BY THE JURY FROM THE FACTS THAT 
16 HER VISION WAS BLOCKED AS TO WHAT WAS COMING UP THE INSIDE 
1 LANE. BUT WHEN--
18 JUDGE YOUNG: SHE HAD INHERENTLY BETTER VISION 
19 THAN WELCHES, CERTAINLY. 
20 " MR. DODD: WELCHES BLOCKED HER VIEW DOWN HIGHLAND 
21 DRIVE. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S TRUE, BUT WELCH'S CAR IS 
23 HEADED NORTHBOUND ON HIGHLAND DRIVE. 
24 MR. DODD: THAT'S TRUE. 
25 JUDGE YOUNG: AND THE NOORBAKHSHES ARE HEADED 
StZ. 
1
 I WESTBOUND COMING THROUGH. YOU ARE PUTTING A DUTY ON WELCHES 
2 I TO BOTH LOOK THROUGH THEIR REAR VIEW MIRROR AND OVER THEIR 
3 I LEFT SHOULDER-
MR. DODD: YES 
5.1 JUDGE YOUNG: --TO SEE IF THE LEFT LANE IS CLEAR 
6
 I BEFORE THEY WAVE THE NOORBAKHSHES THROUGH THEIR OWN LANE, 
MR. DODD: THAT IS CORRECT 
4 
7 
* I JUDGE YOUNG: AND NOORBAKHSH HAS AN UNOBSTRUCTED 
9
 I VIEW, ULTIMATELY, WHEN THEY GET OUT THERE TO LOOK LEFT 
10 I TO BE SURE THE LANE IS CLEAR 
11 MR. DODD: THAT IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY, 
12 WE SUBMIT, YOUR HONOR, AND NOT SOMETHING THAT IS CLEAR 
13 ON THE FACTS AS THEY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IN THIS CASE. 
1* AND, IN ADDITION, WE SUBMIT THAT THE POSITION WE TAKE IS 
15 THE LAW IN THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS. I'D LIKE TO 
I* SUBMIT TO THE COURT THREE CASES COMING FROM VARIOUS JURIS-
17 DICTIONS. 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: ARE THESE CASES CITED IN YOUR 
19 MEMORANDA? 
20
 M R. DODD: NO. WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT THIS 
21
 MORNING. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME TELL YOU, MR. DODD, I READ 
23 THE MATERIAL BEFORE I GET IT NOT AFTER. 
2 4
 MR. DODD: OKAY. 
25 JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOU CAN SUBMIT YOUR CASES BUT 
54 
1 I WON'T READ IT NOW. 
2 MR. DODD: ALL RIGHT. CAN I SUBMIT THE CASES 
3 AND TELL YOU WHAT THEY SAY? 
4 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU CAN TELL ME WHAT THEY SAY. 
5 MR. DODD: THE FIRST CASE IS A WISCONSIN CASE. 
6 MR. DUNN: COULD I HAVE THE CITES TO THOSE? 
7 MR. DODD: I WILL GIVE YOU A COPY. 
8 MR. DUNN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
9 MR. DODD: THIS WISCONSIN CASE DISCUSSES THE 
10 DEVINE CASE, AMONG THE OTHERS. AND THE FACTS INVOLVED 
11 IN THE WISCONSIN CASE ARE ALMOST IDENTICAL. AT THE BOTTOM 
12 OF PAGE 304 IN THE RIGHT-HAND COLUMN THE FACTS AS TO WHAT 
13 CAUSED THE ACCIDENT APPEAR. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE WHERE 
14 A SIGNALOR WAVED A SIGNALEE INTO AN INTERSECTION AND AN 
15 ACCIDENT OCCURRED. AT THE BOTTOM OF PAGE 305, JUDGE, UNDER 
16 THE RIGHT-HAND COLUMN UNDER NO. 5 IT SAYS THE ISSUES, 
17 "SPECIFICALLY, CAN AN OPERATOR OF A MOTOR VEHICLE PARKED 
18 ALONG A CURB BE NEGLIGENT IN SIGNALING ANOTHER MOTORIST 
19 TO PROCEED OUT OF AN ALLEY IN FRONT OF HIM AND INTO THE 
20 STREET." 
21 AND IF YOU GO DOWN TO PAGE 306 UNDER NO. 6 THE 
22 COURT FOUND, "WE BELIEVE THE REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM 
23 THE PLEADINGS ALLEGED AN ASSUMED DUTY OWING TO THE PLAINTIFF 
24 WHICH THE TRUCK DRIVER BREACHED AND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS 
25 A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES." 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
to 
18 
23 
24 
25 
AGAIN, IF YOU LOOK ACROSS ON THE SECOND COLUMN 
ON PAGE 306 THE COURT CITES DEVINE AND DISTINGUISHES IT 
BY SAYING ON PAGE 307 ON THE FIRST COLUMN UNDER NO. 7, 
"THE ABILITY TO FORESEE FUTURE HARM BY THE PERSON SIGNALING 
AND THE FACT OF SUCH ASCERTAINMENT LENDS MEANING TO THE 
SIGNAL AND TO THE REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE 
7
 | SIGNAL MEANT TO THE RECIPIENT." 
OKAY. THAT'S A WISCONSIN CASE. 
THIS MATTER WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN A GEORGIA 
CASE, A COPY OF WHICH I'D LIKE TO GIVE THE COURT. AGAIN, 
11 I ON PAGE 899, THE BOTTOM RIGHT-HAND COLUMN WHERE A DRIVER, 
12 "WAS ATTEMPTING TO EXIT FROM THE DRIVEWAY OF RIDGEVIEW 
13 AND TURN LEFT ACROSS THE TWO NORTHBOUND LANES." THAT'S 
14 EXACTLY THE FACTS THAT WE HAVE IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
15 AT THE TOP, ON PAGE 900, "PLAINTIFFS VIEW OF 
1* THE ONCOMING TRAFFIC FROM THE LEFT WAS BLOCKED BY THE DEFEN-
I7 I DANT'S TRUCK. SHE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER NORTHBOUND CAR." 
IN THIS CASE THE DEVINE, THE UTAH CASE THAT 
19 I THE DEFENDANT WELCHES RELY ON, WAS DISCUSSED AT THE BOTTOM 
2 0
 I OF PAGE 902 IN THE RIGHT-HAND COLUMN. THE COURT SAID, 
21 I "DECISIONS OF OTHER STATES LACK UNANIMITY--BOTH IN REASONING 
2 2
 I AND IN JUDGMENT." AND IT WENT ON TO DO A FULL SCALE REVIEW 
OF ALL THE CASES THEN CURRENT. 
THE BOTTOM OF PAGE 903, IN THE RIGHT-HAND COLUMN 
THEY SAID THIS, "AN OFF-QUOTED STATEMENT BY JUDGE CARDOZO 
* 56
 8 
1 IS APPROPRIATE TO THIS FACTUAL SITUATION: 'IT IS ANCIENT 
2
 LEARNING THAT ONE WHOM ASSUMES TO ACT, EVEN THOUGH GRATUI-
3
 I TOUSLY, MAY THEREBY BECOME SUBJECT TO THE DUTY OF ACTING 
CAREFULLY, IF HE ACTS AT ALL."' 4 
9 
5 I AND THEN ON PAGE 904 IT SAYS, "IN THE INSTANT 
6
 I CASE, IT IS NOT CONTESTED BY THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD THAT 
7
 I DEFENDANT'S DRIVER GAVE A VISUAL HAND SIGNAL." THAT'S 
8
 I NOT CONTESTED IN OUR CASE EITHER. "AND, AS A RESULT OF 
THAT SIGNAL, PLAINTIFF PROCEEDED INTO A STREET THAT SHE 
10 I HAD THERETOFORE REFUSED TO VENTURE AND WAS STRUCK BY A 
11 CAR COMING FROM THE DIRECTION WHERE HER VISION WAS 
12 OBSTRUCTED." AND THEN IT GOES ON TO LIST THE REASONING 
13 AND REASONS WHY THE SIGNALOR WAS FOUND AS CONTRIBUTING 
14 TO THE ACCIDENT. AND AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SECOND COLUMN 
15 ON PAGE 904 THE COURT SAID, "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
lfi GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT AS THE DEFENDANT 
1? DID NOT CARRY ITS BURDEN AND ISSUES REMAIN FOR TRIAL." 
18 WE'RE NOT SAYING, YOUR HONOR, THAT THE JURY 
19 MIGHT NOT CONCLUDE AFTER ALL THE EVIDENCE IS IN, THAT THE 
2 0
 WELCHES WERE MERELY YIELDING THEIR RIGHT-OF-WAY, AS YOU 
21 HAVE MENTIONED. BUT WE WOULD LIKE THE COURT TO GIVE US 
2 2
 I THE CHANCE TO GO TO THE JURY AND NOT MAKE THAT DECISION 
NOW. 
I HAVE ANOTHER CASE COMING OUT OF LOUISIANA, 
WHICH IS VERY SIMILAR TO OURS, AGAIN, WHERE THIS WHOLE 
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1 ISSUE OF THE DUTIES AND THE CARE THAT THE SIGNALOR MUST 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
MAKE WAS DISCUSSED. ON PAGE 99--
JUDGE YOUNG: LET'S STATE THE THREE CASES THAT 
YOU'VE HANDED THE COURT FOR THE RECORD. THE FIRST IS WULF, 
W-U-L-F, V. REBBUN, R-E-B-B-U-N, AND THE CITATION TO THAT 
CASE IS 131 N.W.2D ON PAGE 303. 
THE SECOND IS CUNNINGHAM V. NATIONAL SERVICE 
INDUSTRIES, AND THE CITATION TO THAT IS 331 S.E.2D AT PAGE 
899. THAT IS A GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS, 1985. 
10 I THE FIRST IS A WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT CASE 
H IN 1964. 
12 AND THE THIRD IS THE CASE OF MASSINGALE V. SIBLEY 
13 THE CASE IS 449 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2D SERIES, AT PAGE 98, 
! 4
 A 1984 CASE. 
15 I MR. DODD: THANK YOU. AND THIS THIRD ONE IS 
LOUISIANA. HAVE YOU CITED THAT? 
1* I JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S THE ONE I JUST MENTIONED 
I8 I BUT I DID NOT STATE IT WAS COURT OF APPEALS LOUISIANA, 
FIRST CIRCUIT. 
MR. DODD: THE FACTS IN THAT CASE WERE ALMOST 
IDENTICAL. AT PAGE 99, AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SECOND COLUMN, 
"FRANKS MADE A HAND SIGNAL TO SIBLEY AND SHE PROCEEDED 
2 3
 TO ATTEMPT TO CROSS BOTH WESTBOUND LANES OF PERKINS BUT 
WAS STRUCK BY MASSINGALE. MASSINGALE CLAIMS THAT THEY 
SUSTAINED INJURIES RESULTING," AS THL PLAINTIFF CLAIMS 
58 10 
1
 IN THIS CASE. 
THEN, JUDGE, AS YOU GO TO PAGE 101, THE RIGHT-
HAND COLUMN AT THE TOP, IT SAYS, "THE CONFLICTING INTERPRE-
TATIONS OF THE MEANING OF THE HAND SIGNAL PRESENT A GENUINE 
5
 I ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT FRANKS GRATUITOUSLY 
6
 | ASSUMED AND/OR BREACHED A DUTY OWED TO SIBLEY." THAT'S 
ALL WE'RE SAYING IN THIS CASE. 7 
24 
8 | THAT'S ALL WE'RE SAYING IN THIS CASE. 
' I NOW, FOR PURPOSES OF THE DEFENDANT WELCH'S MOTION,| 
10 I THIS IS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE FACTS HAVE TO BE VIEWED 
11 IN THE MOST FAVORABLE LIGHT TO MY CLIENT, WHO IS THE 
12 AGGRIEVED PARTY. AND WE SAY, AND THE DEPOSITIONS ARE CLEAR, 
13 THAT NOORBAKHSH, THE TORT-FEASOR AS I REFER TO HER, WAITED 
14 FIVE TO TEN MINUTES AT THAT INTERSECTION. SUDDENLY, A 
15 CAR STOPS AND WAVES HER THROUGH AND SHE PROCEEDS THROUGH 
, 6
 AND AN ACCIDENT OCCURS. ALL WE'RE SAYING IS THAT THE JURY 
1 7
 MAY, FROM THAT SET OF FACTS, CONCLUDE THAT WELCH BREACHED 
1 8
 A DUTY OF CARE TO MY CLIENT WHO WAS COMING UP THE ROAD 
1 9
 ON THE INSIDE LANE. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT KIND OF VEHICLE DID WELCHES 
2 !
 I HAVE? 
22 I
 M R . DODD: I THINK IT WAS A BUICK OR AN OLDSMOBIL^ 
23
 M R . DUNN: A BUICK. MRS. WELCH IS HERE. A 
BUICK. 
25 I JUDGE YOUNG: 1 NOTICE THAT THE TWO--WHAT KIND 
- 59 11 
1 OF VEHICLE WAS IT IN THE MASSINGALE V. SIBLEY CASE? I 
2 NOTICE THE OTHER TWO WERE TRUCKS. THOSE ARE MAJOR VEHICLES 
3 THAT CAN BLOCK THE VISION. 
4 MR. DODD: THAT'S RIGHT. AND IT WAS A TRUCK 
5 ALSO IN THE DEVINE CASE THAT THE DEFENDANT RELIES ON. 
6 IN THIS ONE FROM THE LOUISIANA COURT IT WAS A '79 TOYOTA 
7 WAS ONE OF THE CARS AND SIBLEY WAS DRIVING A '79 CHEVROLET 
8 PICKUP TRUCK. 
9 SO WE SUBMIT, YOUR HONOR, THAT AT FIRST GLANCE 
10 DEVINE WOULD APPEAR TO BE INFLUENTIAL IN THIS CASE BUT 
11 UPON FURTHER EXAMINATION WE DON'T THINK IT IS. AND THE 
12 DEVINE COURT, BASED ON THE QUOTE THAT I READ, INDICATED 
13 THAT ONLY THE SET OF FACTS PERTAINING TO THE DEVINE CASE 
14 DOES THEIR DECISION HOLD. 
15 WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN 
16 THE FACTS. IN THE DEVINE CASE THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT 
17 THE TRAFFIC WAS BACKED UP. IN OUR CASE IS EVIDENCE THAT 
18 THIS WAS AT THE BUSY TIME OF THE DAY, ABOUT 4:00 O'CLOCK 
19 IN THE AFTERNOON. TRAFFIC WAS BACKED UP. IN THE DEVINE 
20 CASE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AT ALL THAT THERE WAS ANY WEATHER 
21 CONDITIONS WHICH COULD IMPAIR CONDITIONS. IN OUR CASE, 
22 ALL OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE HAD THEIR TESTIMONY TAKEN SAID 
23 IT WAS RAINING HARD OR HAD BEEN RAINING HARD. AND AS I 
24 MENTIONED BEFORE IN THE DEVINE CASE THE PERSON WHO PROCEEDED 
25 INTO THE INTERSECTION WAS PROCEEDING FROM THE LEFT AND 
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1 HAD A CLEAR VISION OF WHAT WAS COMING UP THE STREET, WHEREAS,! 
2 IN OUR CASE AT BAR THE PERSON WHO PROCEEDED INTO THE INTER-
3 SECTION WAS PROCEEDING FROM THE RIGHT AND HER VISION WAS 
4 BLOCKED BY THE WELCH'S CAR. 
5 IN ADDITION, WE POINT OUT IN OUR BRIEF THAT 
6 NOORBAKHSH, THE PERSON, SIGNALEE, HAD A LEFT TURN BLINKER 
1 GOING. WELCH SHOULD HAVE SEEN IT—IF SHE HAD SEEN IT SHE 
8 SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT NOORBAKHSH WAS GOING TO MAKE A LEFT 
9 TURN. 
10 WE BELIEVE THAT BASED UPON THOSE FACTS THAT 
11 ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE DEVINE CASE AND BASED ON THE MAJORITY 
12 OF THE DECISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AND THAT I 
13 PRESENTED TO THE COURT, THAT WE HAVE A RIGHT TO GO TO THE 
14 JURY ON THOSE THINGS BECAUSE IT IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY 
15 TO DECIDE NEGLIGENCE AND BECAUSE OF THE FACTS AND THE LAW 
16 THIS MOTION BY WELCHES SHOULD BE DENIED. 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. DODD. 
18 MR. DUNN, DO YOU WISH TO RESPOND? 
19 MR. DUNN: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. I THINK 
20 THE COURT IS WELL AWARE OF OUR ARGUMENT. I WOULD HAVE 
21 MADE THE SAME POINTS THAT THE COURT MADE. I THINK THAT 
22 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEVINE AND THIS CASE MAKE REALLY 
23 NO DIFFERENCE WHATSOEVER. 
24 IN UTAH THE COURT HAS NOT ALLOWED THIS TYPE 
*5 OF QUESTION TO GO TO THE JURY. THE DEVINE CASE SAID THAT 
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1 THE MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
2
 IT DID NOT ALLOW IT TO GO TO THE JURY. 
3 THIS CASE HAS BEEN DEPOSED. THERE'S BEEN FOUR 
4
 OR FIVE DEPOSITIONS. I DON'T SEE WHAT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
5 THE PLAINTIFF WOULD WANT TO OBTAIN. 
6 I THINK THE COURT'S IN A POSITION TO SEE WHAT 
7
 HAPPENED IN THIS PARTICULAR MATTER. IT WOULD SERVE NO 
8 PURPOSE WHATSOEVER TO ALLOW THIS TO GO TO TRIAL, TO GO 
9
 TO THE POINT OF A DIRECTED VERDICT MOTION EXCEPT FOR ALLOWING] 
10 PLAINTIFFS TO HAVE A BIGGER STICK TOWARDS SETTLEMENT, TO 
11 GET INTO THE POCKET OF A NON-NEGLIGENT INDIVIDUAL OR HER 
12 INSURANCE COMPANY. AND I WOULD REST AT THAT POINT. 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. DUNN. 
14 MR. FELT, DO YOU HAVE ANY WISDOM ON THIS SUBJECT? 
15 MR. FELT: WELL, WISDOM MAY BE TOO BROAD A TERM. 
1* I THINK THE COURT ZEROED IN ON THE ISSUE. IF THE COURT 
.I7 IS WILLING TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THERE'S NO DUTY 
18 THAT SOMEONE WHO STOPS AND WAVES SOMEONE ELSE INTO THE 
19 INTERSECTION HAS NO DUTY OF CARE TO LOOK AT WHAT'S COMING 
2 0
 IN THE OTHER LANE AND THAT DUTY SOLELY RESTS ON THE PERSON 
2 !
 PULLING UP, THEN THE DEFENDANT SHOULD WIN. IF THE COURT'S 
2 2
 WILLING TO SAY, WELL, MAYBE THERE'S SOME DUTY, DEPENDING 
2 3
 ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE, WHERE SHE WAVES AND MY CLIENT 
2 4
 PULLS INTO THE INTERSECTION FOR HER TO--WHEN SHE UNDERTAKES 
2 5
 THE DUTY THAT ONCE THE AC I ION TO WAVE, MAYBE SHE SHOULD 
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7 
' HAVE CHECKED AND LOOKED WHAT'S COMING BECAUSE SHE SHOULD 
2 I HAVE ANTICIPATED THERE WOULD BE A LEFT TURN SINCE MY CLIENT'S; 
SIGNALING, ONCE THE COURT IS WILLING TO SAY, WELL, THERE'S 
A QUESTION AS TO DUTY OF CARE, THEN YOU GET INTO THE COMPAR' 
5 I ATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND YOU HAVE TO BE WILLING TO RULE AS 
6
 I A MATTER OF LAW THAT 100 PERCENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE SHOULD 
BE SPLIT BEWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, NOORBAKHSH, 
8 I HERE, AND NOTHING IS ON THE PERSON WHO WAVES US ON. I 
9
 DON'T THINK THE COURT'S IN A POSITION TO DO THAT. SO I 
tO THINK THE ISSUE IS IS THERE A DUTY OF CARE HERE. AND THE 
11 CASES GO BACK AND FORTH. I THINK THE COURT CAN READ THOSE 
12 AS WELL AS I . 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, HAVING REVIEWED THE CASES 
H THAT WERE SUBMITTED, AND BELIEVES THAT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED 
15 IN RELATION TO THIS MOTION, THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1* AS TO THE WELCHES IS GRANTED. 
17 I'LL ASK YOU, MR. DUNN, TO PREPARE AN ORDER 
1 8 CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S RULING AND WITH YOUR PLEADINGS 
19 MR. DUNN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR HONOR. 
2-0 j (WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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C E R F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SS 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I 
AM A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
THAT AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE 
HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND 
PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND 
THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND 
THAT THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 1<+TH, 1992 
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